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INTRODUCTION

China has been one of the great successes in the developing world
over the last two decades. A crucial part of the growth of industry
in China has been the rapid growth of township-village enterprises
(TVEs). The success of TVEs poses a puzzle for a property rights
approach to the theory of the firm, since no one really holds welldefined, transferable property rights to control and claim the
residual profits of TVEs. TVEs also pose a second puzzle: in the last
five or seven years, they have started to experience serious
problems, despite reforms which have improved TVEs from a
property rights perspective. This Article will take ideas from
property rights and institutional approaches to economics and
examine whether those ideas can help explain both of these
puzzles. In turn, it will ask what light that examination throws
upon property rights and institutional approaches, particularly as
applied to developing and transitional economies.
China has the world's largest population and one of its largest
economies. Many project that within several decades China will
surpass the United States and become the world's largest economy. 1
It is both the world's largest developing nation and also the largest
nation making the transition from a communist economy. These
facts alone would make Chinese economic institutions a matter of
great interest for anyone who cares about the relationship between
property rights and economic development. China holds even
greater interest for such people because it has followed such an
unusual path in making its transition. Rather than using a "big
bang" strategy and trying to liberalize, privatize, and quickly
move to a capitalist market economy, China has taken a much
more gradual approach, leaving many of its older institutions at
least somewhat in place while introducing new ones and making

1. For the purpose of these projections, the economy is measured by total Gross
National Product (GNP). See ANGUS MADDISON, CHINESE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE

LONG RUN 17 (1998). In terms of GNP per capita, China is worlds away from the United
States, and no one today can predict with any accuracy when, if ever, China may overtake
the United States. See id.; infra note 137.

20041

CHINESE TOWNSHIP-VILLAGE ENTERPRISES

955

piecemeal reforms in the old ones. At least as compared with
Russia, this gradualist approach seems to have worked well so far.
TVEs have been an important part of this approach. Part I
sketches the background facts concerning TVEs and their role
within the Chinese reforms. It explains where townships and
villages fit within the political structure of China and how the
success of TVEs emerged as a largely unintended by-product of
deregulation of product markets combined with incentives created
by the government's federal structure. The Part presents some
figures on the rapid growth of TVEs and the recent slowdown in
that growth. It also briefly explains the complex stew of competing
types of enterprises in China.
Part II takes up the first puzzle which this Article addresses,
namely how TVEs managed to flourish despite being defined by
quite ambiguous property rights. TVEs are, in theory, owned by and
held for the residents of the township or village in which they are
located, meaning that, in effect, local government and party officials
have final control rights over them. Managers run their daily
affairs. One must thus consider the incentives facing both these
managers and the government and party officials. It appears that
the partial reforms of the 1980s gave both officials and managers
enough of a stake in the success of TVEs that they had decently
strong incentives to promote their growth.
Their incentives were better than those facing decision makers
in the two main rival types of enterprises: state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and private enterprises. SOEs, which are typically large
businesses owned and run by higher levels of government, are
controlled by a variety of government agencies, none of which have
adequately strong stakes in making the SOEs more efficient.
Moreover, SOEs face a serious soft budget constraint as state-run
banks guided by agencies provide loans to failing businesses to
keep them afloat. Vis-b-vis private enterprises, TVEs had the key
advantage that they were better protected from government regulation and predation. The combination of federalism and product
market competition in China's political structure was critical in
creating the relative advantages of TVEs.
Part II also considers two conflicting accounts of the success of
TVEs in the first stages of reform. One account treats TVEs as only
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a transitional institution whose advantages over private enterprise arise only because the State could not or would not commit to
nonintervention in the affairs of private enterprises. Once a rule of
law is in place to protect private enterprises, under this account,
TVEs will disappear. A differing account suggests that, perhaps for
cultural reasons, TVEs are an innovative organizational form which
offers lasting advantages. Later Parts return to this question.
Despite the impressive achievements of TVEs in the 1980s and
early 1990s, they were very far from perfect institutions, in part for
reasons suggested by property rights theory. Neither government/
party officials nor managers had clear rights either to residual
returns or to residual control. Part III reports on a variety of
experiments that were tried to improve on the situation. Several
different types of contracts with enterprise managers were tried to
improve their incentives. Ownership reforms also were instituted
to loosen and regularize the control of government and party
officials. Part III reports on evidence from other researchers which
suggests that those reforms did improve productivity, as property
rights theory would suggest.
Part IV turns to our second puzzle, namely the more recent
problems facing TVEs. Why, given the reforms described in Part
III, have TVEs not done better recently? One key part of the answer
seems to be that competing organizational types, especially private
enterprises and enterprises with foreign direct investment, have
become more attractive. Indeed, many TVEs have been privatized.
Part IV considers why that might be so, and also discusses the
barriers that remain for private enterprises in China. It also
suggests that TVE privatization need not necessarily represent an
improvement in efficiency-rent seeking may also explain some of
what is going on. The other key part of the answer to the puzzle of
the decline of TVEs may be the serious limitations which they face.
In particular, TVEs may lack the organizational incentive structure
needed to work well as they grow due to their initial success.
Cultural norms and personal ties which keep small-scale TVEs
working may not be adequate to the task of supporting larger
businesses. These points should not yet be pushed too far, though.
TVEs currently face serious problems, but they are still an impor-
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tant part of the Chinese economy, and their possible decline into
minor status is far from a done deal.
Part V considers various paths which Chinese reform may follow
in the future. One path stresses further liberalization and privatization, with the goal of reaching a Western-style market economy
dominated by private enterprises. Movement along this path will
require a variety of major reforms: banks and capital markets must
be freed from state dominance, the property rights of private
businesses must be secured, courts must become more independent,
and labor markets must be reformed, to name some of the biggest
and most obvious tasks. This path, in turn, splits into two branches:
one branch leads to a U.S.-style system dominated by capital
markets; the other branch leads to a Japanese- or German-style
system dominated by banks.
The second path strives to create a more unique Chinese system,
building on the strengths of TVEs. Chinese culture and society
might allow TVEs to become strong community-based, cooperative
businesses that integrate various stakeholders' interests well.
This path requires reforms to enhance democracy and accountability within both local governments and TVEs themselves. This path
leads to a destination more unknown, and hence riskier, than the
first path, but it cannot be said with any certainty that the path is
necessarily inferior to the first. It is probably less likely to be taken
than the first path, however.
Looming as the major overarching obstacle on both paths is the
tradition, and still reality, of Communist Party dominance over all
areas of life in China. The great achievement of the reforms to date
is giving Party members a stake in enhancing the efficiency of TVEs
and private enterprises and to provide some degree of commitment
against pervasive Party influence in the economy. However, the
reforms have gone only so far in achieving those ends-much more
needs to be done. The great question facing China is whether Party
members will be willing to undertake additional reforms which
further limit the Party's influence. The hope is that past reforms
have set in motion a political and economic dynamic which give
enough Party members a strong stake in further reform. The fear
is that those with ultimate power will still feel too threatened if
reform, at some point, calls into question the ultimate authority of
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the Party. Thus, another possible path is that the reform process
will break down while the Chinese economy still has a long way to
go in catching up with Western nations. This is the least desirable
of the paths and probably less likely to be taken than the first path
(leading to Western-style capitalism), although it is more likely to
be taken than the second path (leading to TVEs as a long-term,
uniquely Chinese institution).
Finally, Part VI considers what events in China, and specifically
TVEs, teach us about the relationship between property rights
and economic development. I suggest four general lessons. The
first concerns the relationship between property rights and other
institutions. Defining property rights properly is important to
development, but other institutions (e.g., norms, financial institutions, capital markets, labor markets, and political structure) are
also quite important. Well-defined property rights (at least,
property rights in collective business associations) are neither
necessary nor sufficient conditions for successful development. The
success of TVEs in the '80s (puzzle 1) shows that well-defined rights
are not necessary for development. The growth of problems in the
'90s despite improved property rights (puzzle 2) shows that
improved rights alone are not adequate-other institutions need to
be in place to encourage development. In China, and I will suggest
in U.S. history as well, product market competition and political
federalism have been at least as important as well-defined property
rights in encouraging development.
The second lesson is that would-be reformers need to consider
carefully the political constraints facing proposed changes in
property rights. One of the main arguments in favor of gradualism
in China is that it limited the harm done to losers within the
economy; that is, those tied to failed enterprises. As new sectors
grew, persons within those sectors created the political base which
supported further reforms. Our fourth lesson will highlight possible
problems with this approach, but alternatives which economists
find attractive on paper but politically infeasible have little
practical point.
The third lesson is that property rights reforms are at least as
much the effect of economic development as they are its cause.
Economic development is a long, dynamic process, and reforming
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property rights, in many cases, may be best addressed only after
other, easier-to-reform institutions have been addressed (the first
lesson) and after political support for property rights reform is in
place (the second lesson).2 This is not to trivialize property rights
reform or downplay its importance. The Chinese themselves have
come to see such reform as crucial to moving forward. At some
point continued development probably becomes quite hard to
maintain without property rights reform. That point, however, will
not necessarily come right at the beginning of development.
The fourth and most speculative lesson is that the development
path followed may affect the end-states which can be reached
feasibly. Part V describes a variety of possible end-states for
Chinese reform. Some reforms along the way, however, could make
reaching one or more of those end-states extremely hard, if not
impossible. For instance, refdrms which create too strong a vested
interest in SOEs and TVEs could make developing institutions
supporting private enterprises harder. Alternatively, going too far
in developing private enterprises could rule out reforms which
might have developed the TVE into a truly unique, long-lasting
alternative type of business organization. If banks are pushed in a
Japanese direction then the expansion of stock markets may be
limited, or the expansion of stock markets may stop China from
adopting a Japanese-style main bank model. Further complicating
matters, it may not be obvious how one reform today may preclude
other reforms tomorrow. A reform which looks like the most
attractive option today could wind up precluding the best long-run
path.
I. BACKGROUND SKETCH
Townships and villages are the lowest rungs in the Chinese
governmental hierarchy.3 Prior to the beginning of reforms in the
2. See infra note 10 for the type of property rights reforms considered in this paper.
3. The full hierarchy from top to bottom is central government, provinces, prefectures,
counties, townships and villages. See Yingyi Qian & Joseph Stiglitz, InstitutionalInnovations
and the Role of Local Governmentin TransitionEconomies: The Case of Guangdong Province
of China, in REFORMING ASIAN SOCIALISM: THE GROWTH OF MARKET INSTITUTIONS 175, 178
(John McMillan & Barry Naughton eds., 1996) [hereinafter REFORMING ASIAN SOCIALISMJ.
Villages are thus units within townships. Municipalities can operate at several of these
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late 1970s they were called communes and brigades.4 They are
located in rural areas and on the outskirts of large cities. The
typical township has a population of 15,000 to 30,000, while the
typical village has a population of 1000 to 2000.' Although much
discussion of TVEs dates their growth only to the beginning of
reform in 1978, Table 1 shows that the collective sector, of which
TVEs are a major component although the numbers do not report
TVEs separately, began to increase its share of national industrial
output in the late 1960s. This growth was not especially encouraged
by the central government, but seems to have emerged as a result
of the decentralized nature of the Chinese political and economic
system, with local cadres taking matters into their own hands.6
TVE growth accelerated in the late '70s and '80s, becoming a
central part of China's rapid growth during that period.7 As Table
1 shows, the collective sector rose to produce about one-third of
China's industrial output, while the state sector's output shrank.8
Although the growth of TVEs does not seem to have been a key part
of the vision of the early reforms, those reforms loosened restrictions on industrial activity in rural areas and allowed greater
competition in many product markets.9 Rural areas also grew richer
and had more labor available as a result of successful reforms in
agriculture.' °
levels. See id. at 178 n.4.
4. See William A. Byrd & Lin Qingsong, China'sRural Industry: An Introduction, in
CHINA'S RURAL INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT, AND REFORM 3, 10-11 (William A. Byrd

& Lin Qingsong eds., 1990).
5. See id. at 3.
6. See Gary H. Jefferson & Thomas G. Rawski, EnterpriseReform in ChineseIndustry,
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 47,49; Louis Putterman, On the Past and Futureof China's
Township and Village-Owned Enterprises,25 WORLD DEV. 1639, 1640-44 (1997) (noting the
"great entrepreneurial ability and drive ... displayed by tens of thousands of rural officials"
in the late 1960s and 1970s).
7. See HONGYI CHEN, THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION OF CHINA'S TOWNSHIP AND
VILLAGE ENTERPRISES: MARKET LIBERALIZATION, CONTRACTUAL FORM INNOVATION AND

PRIVATIZATION 2-6 (2000).
8. See infra Table 1 and notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
9. See Du Haiyan, Causes of Rapid Rural IndustrialDevelopment, in CHINA'S RURAL
INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT, AND REFORM, supra note 4, at 47, 55-56.

10. See id. The importance and timing of de-collectivization of Chinese agriculture
suggests that other types of property rights reform may need to come earlier in the process
of development. "Property rights" are not some kind of monolithic entity; there are many
sorts of property rights in many sorts of things, and a process of economic reform optimally
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This relative growth has slowed more recently. Table 1 shows
that the collective sector stabilized at about one-third of industrial
output during the '90s." The state sector continued to dwindle in

relative size during that decade, but the growth during the decade
came in the private and "other" sector rather than in the collective
sector, including TVEs. Many TVEs began to experience financial
difficulties in the '90s with a number of bankruptcies occurring.12
According to official figures, 15.9% of companies in the collective
sector faced losses in 2000.' Figure 1 shows that the number of
persons employed by TVEs peaked in 1996 and has declined slightly
since then. Figure 2 shows that the number of TVEs peaked in
1994.
TVEs are typically small businesses, with an average of about
six employees in 2000.' However, they have been growing from
an average of about two employees in 1990." s They produce a wide
variety of goods, generally simple ones. Most TVEs produce
goods for local consumption or intermediate goods for larger local
businesses.

16

China has experienced a rather bewildering proliferation oftypes
of enterprises. Later sections go into somewhat more detail as to
some of those types, 7 but a brief description of the leading alternatives may help here. TVEs are controlled by township or village
governments, and nominally owned by the entire township or

might address different sorts of rights at different points in the process. Accordingly,
property rights in real property may be best clarified and protected earlier than property
rights in business associations. My focus in this Article is only on those rights that define

who receives residual benefits and who has residual control in business associations.
11. See infra Table 1. Since overall industrial output continued to grow rapidly during

the '90s, the absolute level of TVE output continued to grow quickly. This point needs to be
qualified by concerns about the accuracy of Chinese statistics. See infra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text.
12. Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggong Xu, Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as
Vaguely Defined Cooperatives, 18 J. COMP. ECON. 121, 135-36 (1994).
13. See CHINAINDUSTRIALECONOMYSTATISTICALYEARBOOK2001, at 48. The percentage
for all Chinese companies is 23.5%. See id.
14. For the number of TVEs and their employees, see infra Figures 1-2.
15. See infra Figures 1-2.
16. See Lan Cao, ChinesePrivatization:Between Plan and Market, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 13, 31 (2000).
17. See infra Part H1.
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village.'" SOEs are controlled by one of the higher levels of government and nominally owned by all the people of China. 9 Private and
"other" enterprises include many different types: some may be
completely owned by one or a few private Chinese citizens, some
may be owned in part by private citizens and in part by various
governmental units, and some may be fully or partly owned by
foreign persons or entities.2" Both the legal and the statistical
realities are murky, making statistics broken down by ownership
quite hard to interpret.
II. PUZZLE 1: THE GROWTH OF TVES IN THE 1980s
According to standard property rights theories of the firm, TVEs
should be a colossal mess. A property rights theory of the firm
focuses on the rules defining who has the right to claim residual
income, who has residual control rights, and how those rights may
be transferred. 2 Following a Coasean approach, the critical
prerequisites are that these rights be clearly defined and that they
be transferable so that they can flow to those who most value
them.2 2 In this Article I contrast a property rights approach to the
firm with an institutionalist approach. Under the latter, property
rights matter, but a variety of other institutions, including norms,
capital markets, banks, laws, and so on, are also crucial to how
firms develop and whether they flourish.2"

18. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 23.
19. See id. at 47.
20. For a summary ofmajor Chinese enterprises, see KEIJIROOTSUKAETAL., INDUSTRIAL
REFORM IN CHINA: PAST PERFORMANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 7 (1998).
21. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 30 (1995); Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,InformationCosts, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm:ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,30708 (1976); see also CHEN, supra note 7, at 7-14; Gary H. Jefferson & Thomas G. Rawski,
China'sEmerging Market for Property Rights: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 10
ECON. OF TRANSITION 585 (2002) (providing a recent application of the property rights
literature to Chinese firms).
22. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
23. See generally MASAHIKOAOKI, TOWARDACOMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONALANALYSIS 22529 (2001) (noting the interdependence of institutions within a given domain).
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TVEs fail to have clearly defined property rights, and in the early
1980s rights were even less clear than now.24 TVEs are notorious
for the ambiguity in their definition of rights to residual income and
control.25 Perhaps even worse, rights to residual benefits and
control were not transferable, and still to a great extent are not.26
Yet, TVEs were a central part of China's rapid growth in the '80s
and early '90S.27 That is our first puzzle, and our task in this and
the next Part is to try to make sense of it. Let us start by taking a
closer look at the structure of TVEs.
Figure 3 gives a stylized schematic view of the flow of benefits
and control rights in TVEs .28 Nominally, the owners of a TVE are
the residents of the township or village in which it is located. In
fact, actual authority over the enterprise lies in the hands of the
local government and party leadership.2 9 These local governmental
and party leaders, in turn, are accountable to government and party
officials at higher levels.3 0 The local political leaders generally will
not make most day-to-day decisions for their local enterprises, but
instead delegate those decisions to the managers of individual
enterprises." Those managers in turn oversee and delegate some
decisions to the enterprise's employees, most but not necessarily all
of whom are residents of the township or village. 2
As for the flow of benefits, again in theory and by law, the
enterprises are to be run for the benefit of community residents.
The reality is more complex and shifting. Ultimately the residents
do receive many of the benefits, either in the form of wages or in the
form of public goods, such as schools and hospitals provided by the
local government and paid for by funds received from the enter24. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 48-53.
25. See David D. Li, A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector, 23 J. COMP. ECON. 1, 3 (1996); Weitzman & Xu,
supra note 12, at 133.
26. See Jefferson & Rawski, supra note 21.
27. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
28. Figure 3 is adapted from figure 2.1 in CHEN, supra note 7, at 22.
29. Id. Sometimes government and party leaders are the same person, but often they are
not. See id. at 26.
30. See id. at 27. In some villages, government leaders are now chosen by direct election.
See id. at 25-26.
31. Id. at 23.
32. See id. at 30-32.
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prises.3 3 Managers are paid from funds from the enterprise's
earnings; the extent to which their pay varies based on the
economic success of the enterprise has varied widely over time and
across enterprises.3 4 As we shall see in the next Part, there has
been a definite trend for managerial pay to become more closely
tied to enterprise performance over time. Local political leaders
may receive money personally from the enterprises, and more
importantly, TVEs are the main sources of funds they can use in
providing goods and services to community residents.3 5 Higher
level politicians also have a stake in the enterprises as some taxes
flow to higher levels of government.3 6
Even from this brief sketch we can see that the two key sets of
actors on whose incentives we must focus are local political leaders
and enterprise managers.3" These two sets of people make most of
the key decisions affecting an enterprise. In the remainder of this
Part we shall examine first how product markets and the federal
system gave these actors relatively strong incentives to make TVEs
more efficient; second, why incentives were better for TVEs than for
either SOEs or private enterprises; and third, major problems that
still remained for TVEs. This Part will end by exploring several
different stories in the existing literature, stories that differ both in
how they explain the success of TVEs and how long they predict
that success will last.
Let us consider first the incentives of local political leaders. Two
key elements of the situation they faced in the early '80s led to the
growth of TVEs. First, reforms allowed rural industrial enterprises
to enter into a large number of product markets.3 8 The second key
element is the nature of the federal political structure. Local
governments are expected to provide a wide range of goods and
services to their residents.3 9 Revenues from TVEs are one of the

33. See id. at 23, 25.
34. Id. at 23.
35. See id. at 26, 34-35.
36. See id. at 32-35.
37. See id. at 21 (noting that these "[tlwo groups of actors participate in decisions that
have led to the expansion of TVEs in rural China").
38. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
39. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 25-27.
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main ways available to fund those requirements. 40 Local leaders
also are given objectives for economic growth in their communities.
How well they meet these economic objectives and provide various
goods and services affects their prospects for advancement with the
State and the Party.4 '
The combination of these two factors gave local political leaders
a strong incentive to develop local TVEs. The opening of product
markets allowed them to produce a variety of goods. The success of
agricultural reform and increased labor-savings provided them with
capital, and greater efficiency in farming left more people available
to do other work.42 The fiscal responsibilities of local political
leaders under the federalist system gave them incentives to have
productive, revenue-making enterprises. 3 Moreover, these two
factors also helped discipline local political leaders and their
enterprises. Product market competition meant that inefficient
businesses would be under serious pressure. 4 Federalism meant
that if a locality was doing poorly, mobile resources (some capital
and labor) would move to other, better-performing areas. 4' Federalism also meant that jurisdictions could learn from the successes
and failures of other jurisdictions. 6
We also must consider the incentives facing TVE managers.
Initially they generally did not have much of a stake in the residual
income of the enterprises which they ran. As we shall see in the
next Part, however, reforms gave them a clear personal stake in the
success of the business. From the inception of TVEs, the managers'
40. See id. at 34-35.
41. See id. at 32-42.
42. See Cao, supra note 16, at 30.
43. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 32-33.
44. See Brett H. McDonnell & Daniel A. Farber, Are Efficient Antitrust Rules Always
Optimal?, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 9-14, on file with author),
for a brief overview of the literature on the important corporate governance benefits from
product market competition.
45. See Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalismas a Commitment To Preserving
Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 88-89 (1997).
46. See CHEN, supranote 7, at 31 ("Whenever leaders of a township or village observed
that their neighboring townships or villages had increased income brought about by newly
established enterprises, they simply launched enterprises of their own to catch up with such
income increases."). See Brett H. McDonnell, The Ambiguous Virtues of Federalism in
Corporate Law (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The William and Mary Law
Review), for an overview of how federalism can encourage experimentation and learning.
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chances for career advancement clearly depended in part on how
well their business performed. Furthermore, since townships and
villages are relatively small units, local political leaders are
somewhat better able to monitor the performance of managers, as
leaders have fewer enterprises under their care than political
leaders at higher levels.
Why did TVEs in the '80s fare better than their leading competitors? Let us first compare them with SOEs. SOEs have been
notoriously poorly run,4 7 and Table 1 shows how their share of
industrial output in China has dropped drastically over the last few
decades. Some important differences between SOEs and TVEs
include the fact that the career success of local political leaders at
the township and village level is more closely tied to the success of
TVEs than is the success of higher-level officials to the success of
SOEs.4" Additionally, higher-level officials are evaluated more on
political and ideological criteria and less on purely economic
criteria.4 9
The smaller scale and scope of the lower-level political units is
also an advantage for TVEs. This means that lower-level officials
have fewer and smaller enterprises to oversee, and they are thus
able to do a better job monitoring the behavior of enterprise
managers.5" Relatedly, lower-level officials live in the relatively
small communities in which they govern and are likely to feel
pressure from residents if they are not delivering the goods. This
acts as a check on township and village officials-a check which is
weaker for higher-level officials. 5 Also, the lower levels of government are organizationally simpler than higher levels, and TVEs are
typically smaller than SOEs. This means that SOEs are often
subject to orders and regulations from a variety of different
ministries, each with its own views and interests and each with the
ability to stop activity which it does not like. This overlapping

47. See, e.g., Cao, supra note 16, at 32-33; Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate
Governance in China:Then and Now, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 18; Yuwa Wei, An Overview
of CorporateGovernance in China, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 23, 24-25 (2003).
48. See OTSUKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 49.
49. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 50-51.
50. See id. at 51-52.
51. See id. at 52.
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can make it harder for enterprises to act
authority at the SOE level
52
quickly and decisively.
A final way in which TVEs are superior to SOEs is they face a
harder budget constraint. One of the classic problems of socialist
enterprises is the soft budget constraint.5 3 The idea is that even
when such enterprises do poorly, they too often are propped up by
the government and not allowed to fail.5 4 However, the threat of
failure is one of the main stimulants of efficient and innovative
behavior in a successful market, and its absence leads to a proliferation of inefficient "white elephants.""5 The soft budget constraint
is a major problem for Chinese SOEs, as the central government
controls the major Chinese banks, which all too frequently make
loans based on political rather than economic criteria-and a
leading political criteria is to sustain the SOEs. 6 There is something of a soft budget constraint for TVEs too, as local financial
institutions have been a major source of finance for them, with local
political leaders guiding loans to the TVEs.57 However, this problem
is less severe, if for no other reason than that the local financial
institutions have many more limited resources and thus cannot
sustain failing local enterprises for as long. 8
These factors help explain why TVEs outperformed SOEs in the
'80s. Why, though, was that growth concentrated in TVEs rather
than in private enterprises? As shown by Table 1, and as we shall
explore more below in Part V, growth in the '90s centered on
private enterprises. Why didn't that happen earlier? The leading

52. See Cao, supra note 16, at 37. Cao notes that "[t]he Chinese refer to the problem as
having too many mothers-in-law." Id. This is an instance of the anticommons problem. See
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 677 (1998).
53. See Jianbo Lou, China's Bank Non-Performing Loan Problem: Seriousness and
Causes, 34 INT'L LAW. 1147, 1156 (2000).
54. See Jiahva Che & Yingyi Qian, InstitutionalEnvironment, Community Government,
and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises, 14 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1, 18 (1998).

55. Janos Kornai, The Soft Budget Constraint,39 KYKLOS 3 (1986).
56. See Cao, supra note 16, at 39-40; Che & Qian, supra note 54, at 17-19.
57. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 60.
58. See Che & Qian, supranote 54, at 17. TVEs also seek funding from the large banks
controlled by the central government, but are lower in priority to SOEs at those banks. See
id. at 19.
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explanations seem to be legal and bureaucratic obstacles to private
enterprises and difficulties in obtaining financing.
A variety of authors have noted that one major advantage of
TVEs over private enterprises in the early reform period was that
TVEs were better protected from state predation, and thus faced
fewer legal and bureaucratic obstacles. 59 State predation is an
endemic problem in China's authoritarian, state-centered system.
For many years private enterprises were not legally allowed at all.
Even once they were tolerated, that tolerance at first was rather
minimal. Private enterprises faced obstacles in obtaining permits
and being allowed to carry on their business, they faced the
corruption of officials, and they found it difficult to get courts to
protect their interests and rights.60 TVEs faced some of the same
problems, but they were sponsored by local government, and hence
local political officials could help protect them and advance their
interests in the bureaucracies and the courts.6 1 Indeed, a number
of TVEs, in all but name, apparently were actually private enterprises which chose to legally organize as TVEs in order to gain
governmental protection. 2
Private enterprises also faced severe difficulties in raising money.
Banks are controlled by the government, and strongly tend to prefer
to lend to enterprises associated with the level of government which
controls the bank. 63 The stock market is still small and limited to
SOEs.6 4 Although TVEs also have had trouble obtaining financing,
local governments had access to some funds, and more ability to
effectively lobby state banking institutions, than private individu-

59. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 54-57; Chun Chang & Yijiang Wang, The Nature of the
Township-Village Enterprise, 19 J. COmP. ECON. 434,443-44 (1994); Che & Qian, supranote

54, at 11-12; Li, supra note 25, at 7.
60. The difficulty of instituting the rule of law in China has been an ongoing theme in the
literature. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43
(2001); Harry Williams, Property Rights and Legal Reform in Township and Village
Enterprisesin China, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'YJ. 227, 230 (2001).
61. See Chang & Wang, supranote 59, at 443.
62. See Williams, supra note 60, at 241.
63. See Chang & Wang, supra note 59, at 444.
64. See William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between
China'sCommunist Politicsand CapitalistSecurities Market, 27 BROOK J. INT'L L. 477,49095 (2002).
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als.65 Thus, the ties of TVEs to local government gave them an
advantage over private enterprises in raising money.
Despite these relative advantages over SOEs and private
enterprises, TVEs still faced a number of problems. Some concerned
the incentives facing local political leaders and their selection.
Although, as argued above, local leaders had good reason to care
about the economic success of TVEs, that was not their only
concern. Ideological conformity, public order, education, promotion
of birth control, and other factors unrelated to TVEs entered into
their formal evaluation,66 and their personal ties to higher-level
officials were, of course, important as well. Moreover, local leaders
were not selected solely on their ability to oversee enterprises, and
their background was still in politics, not business.6 7 Thus, these
were not the ideal people to be in control of Chinese businesses.
A particular incentive problem arising from the political structure is the incentive to misreport economic statistics. Since political
leaders are judged, in important part, on the economic success of
the businesses under their control,68 they have an incentive to
inflate the performance of those businesses.6 9 Some Western
economists think that Chinese economic statistics are very seriously
misleading as a result of this incentive.7 ° Indeed, one could argue
that the explanation for the apparent success of TVEs, and of China
generally, is that it is all a statistical mirage. That would be going
too far, though. These successes are, in part, a statistical mirage,
but even those Western economists who are leading the charge
against the accuracy of Chinese statistics grant that China has
experienced much economic development over the last few

65. See Che & Qian, supra note 54, at 14-15.

66. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 38-39 (noting that, although "the development of TVEs
was the single most direct and critical determinant of township leaders' performance," the
leaders' overall performance was evaluated on the basis of many factors).
67. See id. at 26-27.
68. See id. at 38-39.
69. See id. at 40-41. There is also an incentive to underreport as well, as a way to avoid
sending taxes to the central government. See id. at 64-65.
70. See, e.g., Thomas G. Rawski, China's GDP Statistics-A Case of Caveat Lector? 2
(2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.pitt.edul-tgrawski/papers200l/
caveat.web.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2003).
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decades-to those familiar with the society, the changes arejust too
great to be denied.7 1
Enterprise managers also faced imperfect incentives, particularly
in the early years of reform. 72 They made most of the important
daily decisions about the businesses, and yet were far from being
the residual claimants. v3 The next Part will consider reforms that
have reduced this problem. Even after these reforms, however,
managers probably do not have an adequate stake in the long-term
success of the enterprise. This reduces their incentive to have the
business invest in projects which pay off in the long run and,
additionally, to invest in firm-specific human capital."4 Managers
are also subject to imperfect monitoring by political leaders 7 and
hence have much scope for engaging in self-dealing.
A final problem worth noting is the difficulties in obtaining
financing. Although TVEs were better positioned to obtain financing
than private enterprises, they were disadvantaged relative to SOEs.
The extreme imperfections of the banking system combined with
the lack of working securities markets make raising capital hard.
Local governments have access to some resources, but that is
limited.7 6 Informal financing from family, friends, and employees
was probably important to TVEs as well as private enterprises, but
such sources of capital work well only for quite small businesses.
The term "small business" describes most TVEs pretty well, but
suggests that TVEs are limited in their ability to grow beyond a
small size.

71. See Jefferson & Rawski, supra note 6, at 47 & n.1.
72. See generally Dwight Heald Perkins, Reforming China's Economic System, 26 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 601, 615-18 (1988) (discussing the early economic reforms in China and
how these reforms contributed to problems with enterprise managers).
73. See Jefferson & Rawski, supra note 6, at 51. Of course, this is an issue for managers
of some Western businesses too. In the West, however, the managers of small businesses
(like most TVEs) are generally also owners, or closely supervised by owners. The problems
are more complicated for the managers of large public firms-a wide variety of mechanisms
try to align their interests with those of residual claimants.
74. See Chun Chang et al., Incentive ContractingVersus Ownership Reforms: Evidence
from China's Township and Village Enterprises, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 414, 421 (2003).
75. See Enrico C. Perotti et al., State-Owned Versus Township and Village Enterprises
in China, COMP. ECON. STUDIES, Summer-Fall 1999, at 151, 167.
76. See id. at 152. But cf Che & Qian, supranote 54, at 17-19 (discussing the hard budget
constraints faced by local governments, and noting the positive effects on TVEs).
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I have thus examined the weaknesses in formal property rights
of TVEs, the factors that nonetheless allowed them to grow rapidly
in the '80s, some reasons why they were more successful than either
SOEs or private enterprises, and serious problems which nonetheless remained (in part because of weak property rights). In Part III,
I will consider some property rights and related reforms which the
growth of TVEs helped spur, but first, let us consider two contrasting strands in the literature which attempt to explain the success
of TVEs.
The first strand sees TVEs as largely transitional institutions.
The advantages of TVEs over private enterprises described above
are due largely to serious imperfections in Chinese politics. The
statist system meant that enterprises needed protection from
governmental predation and financing given the limits on private
financial institutions." Once these state-imposed limits on private
enterprises are reduced enough, one would then expect-TVEs to
become less advantageous than private enterprises, and thus TVEs
would be likely to decline in importance.7"
A competing strand sees possible longer-run strengths in TVEs.
Some suggest that they represent more cooperative forms of
organization which are made possible by the alleged higher-trust
environment of China.79 Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijan Qian
point out that China is a major exception to the empirical literature
which suggests a strong connection between legal protections of
investors, capital markets, and economic growth.8 ° William Simon
77. See Chang & Wang, supra note 59, at 443.
78. See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 7, at 244-45; Chang & Wang, supra note 59, at 449; Che
& Qian, supra note 54; Li, supra note 25; YINGYIQIAN, HOWREFORM WORKED IN CHINA 19-22
(The William Davidson Inst. at the Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 473, 2002),
availableat http://eres.bus.umich.eduldocs/workpap-dav/wp473.pdf; YINGYIQIAN&JINGLIAN
Wu, CHINA'S TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY: HOW FAR ACROSS THE RIVER? 23-25 (Ctr.
for Research of Econ. Dev. and Policy Reform, Working Paper No. 69, 2000), available at
http://credpr.stanford.edu/pdf/credpr69.pdf (analyzing the factors leading to the decline of
TVEs and the rise of private enterprise).
79. See Weitzman & Xu, supra note 12, at 13741.
80. See FRANKLIN ALLEN ET AL., LAW, FINANCE, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 17-20
(Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 02-44, 2002), available at http://fic.wharton.
upenn.edu/fic/papers/02/0244.pdf (elucidating some financing practices that result from the
lack of financial regulation). For an extended analysis of the literature to which they refer,
see FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF
BANKS, MARKETS, AND DEVELOPMENT (Asli Demirgdc-Kunt & Ross Levine eds., 2001).
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suggests that TVEs could represent a new organizational form
based on a commitment to community members with a long-term
commitment to the enterprise.8 '
These two strands make both positive and normative claims that
are interrelated but should be distinguished. The positive claims
differ as to whether TVEs will tend to fade away over time. The
normative claims differ as to whether TVEs represent efficient or
otherwise normatively attractive organizational forms that compare
favorably with private enterprises in an environment where the
latter are less discriminated against than in the China of the '80s.
If one believes that the more efficient type of organization will tend
to dominate over time, then the two sets of claims tend to converge,
but that evolutionary dynamic need not be true at all. 2 TVEs could
continue to prosper in China despite relative inefficiency if it is in
the interest of dominant elites to keep them going. Conversely,
TVEs could lose ground to private enterprises even if they are
relatively efficient if elites find they can profit more personally
from private enterprises than from TVEs. Neither possibility can
be ruled out in China today. Part IV will return to the positive
question in considering the growth of private enterprises and
stagnation of TVEs in recent years. Part V will return to the
normative question in considering various paths that Chinese
reform could follow in the future.
III. CONTRACTUAL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM IN TVEs
Chinese reformers were not blind to the property rights problems
posed by TVEs. Indeed, writing by Western economists such as
Harold Demsetz influenced their thinking on the subject and helped
inspire some of the reforms described in this Part.8 3 More impor81. See William H. Simon, The Legal Structure of the Chinese "Socialist Market"
Enterprise, 21 J. CORP. L. 267, 277-78 (1996).
82. I make a similar point on the importance of distinguishing between positive and
normative claims in comparing U.S. market-centered corporate governance with Japanese
and German bank-centered models in my article on the corporate governance convergence
debate. See Brett H. McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance-Possible,but Not
Desirable, 47 ViL. L. REV. 341, 383-84 (2002).

83. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 21, at 787-88; Harold Demsetz, TowardA Theory
of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354-59 (1967).
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tantly, the advantages to be gained from prospering TVEs gave
local and central officials incentive to search for new reforms which
improved their performance. 4 Initial efforts focused on improving
the contractual relationship between enterprise managers and
enterprises. Later efforts moved to deeper changes in ownership
structure. This Part first will describe briefly some of the reforms
that have occurred. It will then review Hongyi Chen's work
explaining the adoption of different contractual reforms, and recent
work by three Carlson School of Management scholars on the
economic effects of the contractual and property rights reforms.
This Part concludes by arguing that these two pieces of research
suggest both that property rights affect economic performance and
that property rights reforms are, in turn, the result of economic and
political development-two of the general lessons which I return to
in Part VI.
Chen usefully divides the varied forms of contracts between
managers and enterprises into three main types: fixed-wage, profitsharing, and fixed-payment.85 Under the fixed-wage system, which
prevailed early, the manager receives a fixed wage but has no claim
to the firm's residual profits. This system gives the manager "weak
incentive[s] to improve the efficiency of the firm." 6 Under profitsharing, the manager receives some fraction of the residual. This
strengthens the manager's incentive to improve efficiency, with
the incentive growing stronger as the fraction which the manager
receives grows larger.8 7 Under the fixed-payment system, the
enterprise manager pays a fixed payment to the local government
and then the manager is entitled to the entire residual. 88 This gives
the manager the strongest incentive of the three forms. 89 Note,
though, that the manager's incentives are not yet fully optimal
84. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
85. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 107-12. Chen also has a somewhat more detailed scheme
with six contractual forms: work-point, wage/salary, collective contractual responsibility,
personal contractual responsibility, leasing, and auction. See id. at 83-102.
86. Id. at 108.
87. Id.
88. See id. In some ways this system parallels a model from Chinese history: the salt
industry. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, Ts'AO YIN AND THE KANG-HiS EMPEROR: BONDSERVANT

AND MASTER 179-84 (1966); FREDERIC WAKEMAN, JR., THE FALL OF IMPERIAL CHINA 47-50
(1975).
89. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 108.
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under the fixed-payment system, as the manager does not have an
adequate stake in future increases to profit which may result from
current expenditures.9 0 Leasing contracts typically last three to five
years. 91
The lack of fully optimized managerial incentives encouraged
property rights reform, and, indeed, the changes in contractual
form were followed by changes in property rights. In some cases,
local governments have simply sold enterprises in their entirety to
one or a few private persons. 92 In other cases they have converted
enterprises into stock companies or share cooperatives.9" The
enterprise is set up as a company where ownership rights-control
and residual claimant status-are defined by share ownership.
Typically, the local government retains some shares (or rather, the
local residents collectively retain shares, with the local government
representing them), employees are given a collective share, and
individual employees or other persons are given individual shares . 9'
The government may or may not retain a majority of the shares.9 5
The idea behind this conversion is to obtain the benefits of clearly
defined property rights.
There are two interesting pieces of research on these developments, one on the causes of the contractual reforms, and one on the
results of the contractual and property rights reforms. Chen
analyzed, theoretically and empirically, how local governments
might choose between the three basic types of contractual forms
(fixed-wage, profit-sharing, and fixed-payment).9 6 She argued that
both enterprise managers and local political officials may add value
to the enterprise. 97 Managers contribute expertise and effort in
organizing production, monitoring the work force, and so on.
Political officials help by providing external resources (capital,
labor, protection from interference) which their political connections
90. Id. at 108-09.

91. See id. at 98.
92. See Chang et al., supra note 74, at 419.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 420.
95. See id.; see also CHEN, supra note 7, at 103-05 (providing an example of a TVE which
converted to joint stock ownership).
96. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 113-19.
97. See id. at 151.
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help them obtain within China's imperfect market environment.
Efficiency suggests giving more control and incentives to political
officials where the latter issues are more critical to the enterprise
(with the fixed-wage system as the extreme in this direction), while
managers should get more control and incentives where the former
issues are more important (with the fixed-payment system as the
extreme in this direction). 98
Chen tested this hypothesis using field data she gathered from
sixty-four TVEs.99 She found that her model adequately explained
the data as to type of contract used."0 In the early years of reform
and in regions that have not reformed very far, using political
connections to obtain resources was of greater importance, and so
the fixed-wage system was more common.'"' As reforms continued
and China became a more open market economy, the importance of
political connections diminished relative to the task of organizing
internal production efficiently."2 Hence there was a move first to
profit-sharing and then to the fixed-payment system."0 ' This is a
very interesting example of how persons and institutions endogenously are induced to develop and change property relations in
response to other changes that are occurring in the economy and
society.
The other interesting piece of research is by Chang, McCall, and
Wang at the Carlson School of Management.0 4 They considered the
effects of both the contractual reforms and the property rights
reforms described above. Their data set was eighty firms in Wuxi
City spanning the years 1984 to 1993.105 Their dependent variables
were return on equity and return on assets.0 6 They found that both
contractual reforms and ownership reforms improved firm performance, although the coefficient for the contracting variable was

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 139-41.
See id. at 193.
See id.at 205-07.
See id. at 199.
See id. at 204.
See id.
Chang et al., supra note 74, at 416-17.
See id. at 419.
See id. at 423.
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statistically insignificant. 107 These results provide some support for
the standard argument that improved property rights improve
economic performance.
Property rights reforms alone, of course, do not guarantee good
corporate governance. After all, stock companies in Western econ0 There are
omies still face serious corporate governance questions.'"
two basic types of governance problems in Western corporations.
First, in companies with many dispersed shareholders, there is the
problem of controlling managers and limiting their ability to make
decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of the business.'o9
Second, in companies with a controlling shareholder, the controlling
shareholder may exploit minority shareholders. 10
What is rather unique about China is that these two problems
can occur, in severe forms, simultaneously. Usually in developed
economies if there is a controlling shareholder, then at least
that shareholder generally has the will and the means to control
managers. In China, however, if the controlling shareholder is a
unit of the government, then that government may not do a good job
of monitoring managers, and yet also may make decisions which
benefit itself at the expense of minority shareholders. TVEs that
have converted to stock ownership probably face both of these
problems. Perhaps the problem of controlling managers is limited
by the relatively small size of the enterprises, and the problem of
exploiting minority shareholders is limited by the prospects of
107. See id. at 416. One possible objection to these results is that only firms with good
prospects were chosen for reform, and thus reform itself may not explain the good
performance. The authors were aware of this possibility and attempted to correct for it by
adding variables that indicated whether an enterprise switched structure in the next year
or two. See id. at 424. They found that this did not change their results. See id. at 424-25. It
is possible, though, that their indicator variables did not adequately capture the information
local officials may have had as to the prospects of different enterprises.
108. See, e.g., Steve Thompson & Mike Wright, Corporate Governance: The Role of

Restructuring Transactions,105 ECON. J. 690, 690-91 (1995) (evaluating corporate restructuring as a solution to corporate governance problems).
109. See JAMES E. POST ET AL., REDEFINING THE CORPORATION: STAKEHOLDER
MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 31-32 (2002).

110. Elizabeth Maynes, Reallocationof Voting Rights and Shareholders'Wealth, 25 CAN.

J. ECON. 538, 539 (1992) (discussing steps taken by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission as a result of concerns about minority stockholders being unprotected against
disadvantageous corporate actions taken by the corporation); Luigi Zingales, What
Determines the Value of CorporateVotes?, 110 Q. J. ECON. 1047, 1047, 1069 (1995).

2004]

CHINESE TOWNSHIP-VILLAGE ENTERPRISES

977

repeat business, or by the fact that local officials may have a variety
of other relationships with other shareholders. Where the combination of these two problems together seems truly serious is in
Chinese SOEs, which have also turned to stock ownership reform,
but, so far, with fairly limited results."' I will return to these issues
in the next two Parts.
Despite these remaining problems, the reforms considered in this
Part nicely illustrate two of the general lessons I will discuss in the
final Part. The first is that well-defined property rights are helpful
for economic development, although other things matter too. 112 The
work of Chang, McCall, and Wang illustrates the benefits from
improved property rights."' The struggles which reformed SOEs
still face, however, illustrate that property rights reforms alone are
not enough. Chen's research and the timing of the property rights
reforms illustrate that property rights change is often the result of
economic development, not simply its cause." 4 Local officials
became interested in TVEs for the reasons discussed in Part II.11
Once committed to these enterprises, they had reason to want to
make them perform better. Improved contracts and property rights
help performance, and so local officials were led to the reforms we
have discussed in this Part.
IV. PUZZLE 2: RELATIVE STAGNATION OF TVEs IN THE 1990s
Given the contractual and property rights reforms, one might
have expected that TVEs would continue to flourish in the 1990s.
Yet we have already seen that, at least in relative terms, TVEs
stagnated during the decade. Table 1 shows that the collective
sector did not continue to increase its share of industrial output.
Figures 1 and 2 show that the number of employees and enterprises
also stagnated.

111. See generally Cao, supra note 16, at 33-43 (discussing the problems encountered by
Chinese SOEs during the initial reforms converting them from state-run to state-owned).
112. See infra Part VI.A.
113. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
114. See infra Part VI.C.
115. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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What happened? That is the question posed for this Part. Part of
the answer starts to emerge from looking at Table 1. The proportion
of industrial output contributed by private and "other" enterprises
skyrocketed in the '90s. That sector became the leading edge of
Chinese growth. This Part will give some answers as to why that
occurred. Those answers are considerably more speculative than the
points made in the last two Parts, as we are now considering a more
recent time period, and, so far, less research is available (at least in
English) to explain trends during that time. Still, we can start to
look for answers in emerging strengths of competing organizational
types and in weaknesses of TVEs.
Perhaps the biggest question is why entrepreneurs have suddenly
found private enterprises more attractive. Here the current
literature is perhaps most lacking in addressing this question, but
there are at least some clues. Part of the answer is that many new
private and "other" enterprises are former TVEs that have been
turned into stock companies with some of their stock sold to private
persons or organizations." 6 One needs to be wary about the
statistics: even an enterprise in which the local government retains
a majority of the shares may turn up in the "other" category. To the
extent this is true, the shift from TVEs still may be more apparent
than real, because an enterprise in which the government retains
a majority of the shares is still effectively controlled by the government. Indeed, even where the government has only a minority of
shares, it (or the Party) may well still effectively control the voting
of the workers' collective shares, giving it effective control." 7 Still,
an enterprise totally owned by the local community is presumably
somewhat different than one with minority shareholders-the local
government needs to worry about keeping those shareholders happy
if it wants to encourage further investment.
A key question is how well the partially or totally privatized
TVEs are functioning, and whether the change has led to efficiency
improvement. The research by Chang, McCall, and Wang provides
at least a partial answer that there have indeed been efficiency
improvements." 8 It is not obvious that this need be so. Some of the
116. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
117. See Chang et al., supra note 74, at 420.
118. See id. at 426.

2004]

CHINESE TOWNSHIP-VILLAGE ENTERPRISES

979

privatizations involved sales to local officials or their family or
friends, probably at low prices, and may represent rent seeking
rather than moving resources into the hands of people who can use
them more efficiently." 9 Even if this is so, however, those resources
now in private hands would be worth more to those persons if they
were effectively able to sell control of the enterprise to those who
could create more value from them. Thus, even rent-seeking
privatizations create some political pressure for further improvements in0 property rights increasing the transferability of ownership
12
rights.
Clearly the political and legal atmosphere facing private enterprises today has become better than in the '80s. Most accounts,
however, still suggest that China is far from having established
what Westerners would recognize as an effective rule of law. 2 '
There have, however, been some moves in the direction of the rule
of law, as "[contracts are becoming more reliable, and corporations
can be established on firmer ground than previously. " 122 Still, much
of the development of private enterprises in China today probably
represents a variant of crony capitalism, as those with ties to local
leaders are able to set up or buy businesses through bypassing
rules and procedures which would thwart those who are less wellconnected.' 23
Another important part of the growth of the private and "other"
categories is foreign direct investment. There was a large growth in
foreign investment in China during the '90s. One benefit of such
investment is that it gives governments stronger incentives to
protect private property rights, since foreign investors can quite
credibly threaten to pull out of a jurisdiction, or at least invest no
further, if they find that local institutions are not treating them
fairly. Of course, such incentives will not always outweigh the
private and short-term incentives politicians may have to treat
119. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 101-02 for an example.
120. For the importance of such reforms for China today, see Jefferson & Rawski, supra
note 21.
121. See Orts, supra note 60, at 106-10.
122. See id. at 106.
123. To be fair, the biographies of the President and Vice-President of the United States
demonstrate that crony capitalism lives on even in the world's most advanced capitalist
society.
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businesses unfairly, but the mobility of foreign investment at least
creates more pressure for protecting the interests of private
enterprises.
During the '90s, some SOEs possibly became stronger competitors of TVEs, although the overall share of SOEs in industrial
production continued to decline.' 24 Competition from TVEs put
pressure on SOEs to reform. In the '90s many SOEs were corporatized, that is, turned into stock companies. 2 ' To encourage
better governance of the newly corporate companies, in 1993 China
instituted a new Company Law, which resembles Western laws in
many respects. 2 6 It also instituted stock exchanges and a new
securities law to help finance SOEs.' 2 7
As noted above, however, big problems remain for SOEs. 28
Passage of a decent corporation law alone is far from assuring
good corporate governance. Good governance in Western companies depends on a host of supporting institutions, such as capital
markets, managerial labor markets, markets for corporate control,
product market competition, independent accountants and accounting standards, and even norms.' 29 Corporatized SOEs in China
seem to face a grim two-fer that is rare in Western companies: the
controlling shareholder (the State) takes advantage of minority
shareholders, while managers take advantage of all shareholders
because the supervising state agencies have neither the interest nor
the ability to adequately supervise the managers. Thus, although
124. See infra Table 1.
125. See Schipani & Liu, supra note 47, at 24-25; Simon, supra note 81, at 288.
126. See Company Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted at the Fifth Meeting
of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress, 1993, available at
http://www.cclaw.net/download/companylaw.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2004) (unofficial
English translation) [hereinafter Company Law]. The law, however, is not similar to Western
corporate laws in all respects. One doubts that any U.S. state corporation law contains
anything like the provisions of Article 14: "A company must, when engaging in business
activities, abide by the law, observe professional ethics, strengthen the construction of
socialist culture and ideology and accept supervision of the government and the public." Id.
at ch. 1, art. 14.
127. Securities Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted by the Sixth Session of the
Ninth National People's Congress, 1998, available at www.chinaonline.com/refer/legal/
laws_regs/pdfpdf e/c9100377e.pdf(last visited Feb. 18,2004) (unofficial English translation).
128. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
129. See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. CorporateLaw Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1085-1100
(2004).
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some SOEs may have reformed enough to pose stronger competition
to TVEs, SOEs generally do not appear to be the major problem
TVEs face. Indeed, SOEs represent one area where reform in China
has not yet succeeded. 30
The other main type of cause for the relative stagnation of TVEs
would seem to be their own weaknesses. One major weakness
they face is, perhaps, not really an internal weakness: TVEs have
trouble obtaining financing.131 Much of the problem here lies with
China's largely unreformed banking system, which is still heavily
biased to SOEs. The stock markets are even more explicitly limited
to SOEs. 3 2 Private enterprises can at least draw upon personal
savings and foreign investment. Part of the problem of obtaining
financing, however, is probably due to internal weaknesses: if TVEs
were a more attractive vehicle for individuals and foreigners, they
could probably attract more investment.
The internal weakness of some TVEs may be a result of their
past success. Part of what may keep many TVEs working adequately is their small size.'3 3 Even if local political officials are
not ideally suited to monitor the internal workings of businesses,
their task is easier if the businesses are not very big. TVEs also
may not attract the very best managers, nor give them the very best
incentives, but again, if the businesses are small this drawback
may not be too severe. A variety of articles have argued that
cultural norms and personal ties help small-scale Chinese businesses succeed without the formal protections and structures of
34
Western corporations.
The very success of TVEs, however, may have caused some of
them to grow much larger, and made growth the more efficient
path for others. If the internal controls of TVEs are liable to break
down beyond a certain point, though, this growth could cause
problems. Or, recognizing the likelihood of such problems, investors
may be turning to other organizational forms as the optimal scale
130. See QIAN, supra note 78, at 43-49.
131. Cf Che & Qian, supranote 54, at 14-19 (explaining that, although TVEs have greater
capital access than private enterprises, they have harder access than SOEs and were "hit
badly during the retrenchment period" in their ability to obtain loans).
132. See Friedman, supra note 64, at 488-89.
133. TVEs have tended to be quite small. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
134. See Weitzman & Xu, supranote 12, at 137-41; ALLEN ETAL., supra note 80, at 33-34.
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of businesses increases. This point remains speculative, and the
literature on TVEs has not yet produced clear evidence in its favor.
However, it seems a plausible explanation worth exploring. 13 5
This Part has argued that stagnation and possibly even decline
has set in for TVEs. That point, however, is itself speculative. After
all, though the percentage contribution to output may have stopped
growing, overall output continued to grow strongly in China during
the '90s,136 and thus the absolute value of TVEs continued to grow.
The trends do not yet show any clear decline in the relative share
of TVEs in the Chinese economy. If such a decline does eventually
occur, then this Part has suggested some reasons for it. Such a
decline, however, is not inevitable. Even if it does occur, it may be
the result of policy choices which one could question, rather than
the result of any inherent inefficiency of TVEs. We now turn to
consider possible future paths for TVEs, and policies which might
lead to those paths.
V. FUTURE PATHS AND POLICY CHOICES

China's reforms are far from finished. China is still a relatively
poor country, 137 many of its economic institutions are still quite
inefficient, and it is still some distance from achieving a full-fledged

135. A recent Wall Street Journal article makes a similar point regarding private
enterprises in China:
Many private ventures, which began as small family shops, now face bigcompany issues: managing expansion, forays into international markets,
increasingly complicated finances, stock-market listings and the fight against
rip-offs of their own brands. Whether these firms are ready to provide greater
transparency, and whether they have the depth of management needed to
handle their growth, will determine whether Wenzhou's trajectory remains
upward.
Ben Dolven, China'sTest Lab for Business: Wenzhou City Shows the Challengesas Private
Sector GainsHeft, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2003, at C3.
136. See infra Table 1.But see supranotes 68-71 and accompanying text (noting the caveat
as to statistics).
137. China's gross domestic product (GDP) per person, using a purchase power parity
measure, was $3550 in 1999; the figure for the United States was $31,910. See THE
ECONOMIST POCKET WORLD INFIGuRES 234-37 (2002). For comparison's sake, here are the
figures for a few other notable countries: Taiwan, $21,140; Greece, $15,800; South Africa,
$8710; Mexico, $8070; Brazil, $6840; Thailand, $5950; Philippines, $3990; North Korea, $970.
See id.
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market economy.1 8 The question is, what is next for China? This
question has both a positive component (where will China go next?)
and a normative component (where should China go next?). The
answers to the two components could, of course, be quite different.
In this Part, I will discuss three or four (depending on how you
count) paths which China could follow. I then discuss the relative
likelihood and attractiveness of the different paths, and whether all
of the paths are necessarily mutually exclusive. The Part concludes
by noting that the core question for China's future is whether Party
officials will be willing to continue the process of limiting the Party
and the State's ability to interfere in economic affairs. Whatever
happens, interesting political battles appear likely for China's
future.
A. The Path of Liberalizationand Privatization
The first possible path for China stresses further liberalization
and privatization. The goal of this path is a Western-style market
economy dominated by private enterprises. If it is followed, TVEs
and SOEs will eventually either be privatized or else wither away
into unimportance. One part of this path of course involves transferring current state-owned enterprises over to private owners and
revising various laws and rules which discourage private ownership.
To succeed, however, this path must involve much more than
ownership transfers and legal revisions. A variety of supporting
institutions must be developed and improved in order for private
enterprises in China to flourish."3 9 As Enron and other recent
scandals illustrate, even in the United States good governance of
private enterprises is a fragile achievement, particularly for large
businesses. Vital supporting institutions include banks, capital
markets, property rights, independent courts and the rule of law,
138. See K. Matthew Wong, Note, SecuritiesRegulations in China and Their Corporate
FinanceImplicationson State EnterpriseReform, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221, 1223-24, 1245
(1996).
139. See Cao, supra note 16, at 14; McDonnell, supra note 82, at 383-84; Paredes, supra
note 129, at 1085-1100. These commentators stress the importance of a variety of supporting
institutions in order to achieve good corporate governance in Western-style private
enterprises.
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and labor markets. Let us look at each of these in turn, and see
where China stands today.
Banks are one economic institution that has not yet received
enough successful attention from Chinese reformers. 14' As noted
above, the main banks of China are still owned by the State and
loans are still granted for political reasons and heavily favor SOEs,
creating a serious soft budget constraint problem.14 The banking
system thus takes private savings and misdirects them to inefficient SOEs. 142 This must change. One source of change would be to
change the ownership structure of existing banks. If bank ownership could be diversified to a variety of state or even private
organizations, bank performance might improve.14 There has been
some movement in this direction with the Communication Bank of
China.144 Perhaps more helpful would be to allow more entry and
competition among banks. Foreign banks could provide better
monitoring and choice of loans, and competition from them would
force domestic banks to do a betterjob.'45 Ultimately,
one would like
46
to see privately owned domestic Chinese banks. 1
Chinese capital markets are also underdeveloped. China does
have several stock markets. However, it strictly controls what firms
can offer shares, with entry basically limited to favored SOEs. 47
Thus, today's stock markets, like today's banks, essentially act as
a way to channel private investment into state enterprises. 148 In the
United States and countries with similar institutions, a wellfunctioning stock market is vital to good corporate governance for
large businesses. The stock market creates a market for corporate
control, which helps discipline managers, and provides the basis
for equity compensation, which helps improve the incentives of
140. See QIAN & Wu, supra note 78, at 14-15.
141. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
142. See Cao, supra note 16, at 39-40.
143. See QIAN & Wu, supra note 78, at 22.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. For a discussion of a move in this direction, see Chi Hung Kwan, Contrasting
Banking Reforms in Japan and China-Nationalization vs. Privatization, China in
Transition (June 13,2003), availableat www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/(last visited Feb. 18,2004).
147. See Friedman, supra note 64, at 479-89.
148. See Cao, supra note 16, at 48.

20041

CHINESE TOWNSHIP-VILLAGE ENTERPRISES

985

managers. 149 A complex web of securities law, monitoring by large
institutional shareholders, exchange regulation, state corporate
law, managerial labor markets, and norms governing directors
helps make the U.S. stock markets work. China has started to put
some of the pieces in place, including a fairly modern securities
law' and company law.'' More of the puzzle, however, needs to be
put together.
Property rights for private enterprises and their owners are
indeed one part of the puzzle, though only one part. China now has
a Law on Individually-Owned Enterprises which provides some
legal protection for private enterprises.5 2 Legal obstacles, however,
remain which could be removed. For instance, the initial capital
requirement for limited liability companies ($60,000) is quite
high.'5 3 More generally, a web of regulations and permit and
licensing requirements can make it quite hard, time-consuming,
and expensive to start a business. Such rules need to be simplified.
Even if laws and rules are improved, they also need to be
enforced in an impartial and predictable way-a requirement often
referred to as the "rule of law."' Here too, much remains to be
done. A major obstacle, which I shall discuss more below, remains
the central role of the Party. 55 Another issue is the tendency of
local courts to favor local interests, especially the interests of local
officials and their friends.5 6 Qian and Wu suggest a two-tier
judiciary, with a lower tier of local courts and a federal or central
tier with the power of appellate review above that, as a way to
combat the latter problem.5 7 The former problem is a tougher nut
to crack. Rules protecting sitting judges from being removed or
having their pay reduced, along the lines of the Article III protection of judges in the U.S. Constitution,' might help, but even that
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See McDonnell, supra note 82, at 341.
See supra note 127.
See supra note 126.
See QIAN & Wu, supra note 78, at 24.
See id. at 25.
See Orts, supra note 60, at 74-77 (describing the "western concept" of the "rule of law"

as distinct from other possible interpretations of the term).
155.
156.
157.
158.

See QIAN & WU, supranote 78, at 21.
See id. at 28.
See id. at 28-29.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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would not get at the problem of the Party's dominance in the
selection of judges.
Labor markets are another part of the mix of Western-style
corporate governance. In particular, managerial labor markets help
give managers incentive to behave themselves-managers with
59
good reputations are more likely to get better jobs elsewhere.
Labor markets for lower level workers are also part of effective
corporate governance in that enterprises which do well can afford
to pay their employees more, and enterprises with reputations for
treating their employees well are likely to attract better, more
efficient employees. For these markets to work, managers and
employees must be able to move about and choose where to work.
Many old restrictions on movement and enterprise choice have been
60
removed, although some remain. 1
As we shall discuss more soon, many of these reforms may
threaten the interests of existing state and Party officials, making
them difficult to implement. Moreover, investors will be less likely
to invest in private enterprises if they think the prospects for
further reforms along the lines suggested above are dim. Thus, one
final type of reform required to make further liberalization and
privatization work is reform of the political system itself. In the
end, might this require allowing real political competition, including the entry of new parties? We shall discuss that below. That reform still seems far away. One, more limited reform with some real
promise is now being tried, though. The Party of Chairman Mao
now allows private business people to become Party members.' 6 '
Hopefully, allowing entrepreneurs into the Party will create an
internal constituency which will push for further reforms along
the lines discussed above. This dramatic political change, though,
carries the risk that it will lead to crony capitalism, with entrepreneurs using their position within the Party to favor their own

159. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288, 292 (1980) (discussing managerial incentives).
160. See OTSUKA ETAL., supra note 20, at 197-99.
161. See Jasper Becker, Beijing Dispatch:Mussolini Redux, THE NEW REPUBLIc, June 23,
2003, at 16. This is part of the "Three Represents" program. For discussion of the "Three
Represents' program, see Zou Keyuan, JudicialReform in China:Recent Developments and
FutureProspects, 36 INVL LAW, 1039, 1041 n.13 (2002).
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businesses, rather than to create laws which favor private enterprises more generally.
This first path of liberalization and privatization may divide into
two different sub-paths. So far, I have treated Western-style private
enterprise systems as an undifferentiated whole. At least two quite
differing types of systems, however, exist among advanced capitalist economies. The U.S. economy is dominated by sophisticated
capital markets, while the Japanese and German economies are
dominated by large banks.1" 2 Insofar as these are competing
alternatives, developing countries like China will at some point
need to choose among them.163 There has already been some effort
16
to experiment with main bank relationships in China.'
B. The Path of Democratization
China's second path 6 ' focuses on democratization rather than on
liberalization and privatization. This path treats TVEs as a longterm institutional innovation rather than a transitional phenomenon. Some analysts of TVEs have seen in them the seeds of a new
long-term development. 1 6 There has been much debate over
whether Western enterprises, especially those in the United States,
adequately reflect the interests of stakeholders other than managers and shareholders. 1 67 Some scholars believe that corporations
should be run in the interests of shareholders only, while others

162. See McDonnell, supranote 82, at 343-45. Not all commentators see banks and capital
markets as alternative systems; some argue that instead they complement each other. See
FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 21-22 (2000); Thorsten
Beck & Ross Levine, Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: PanelEvidence, 28 J. BANKING &
FIN. 423 (2003).
163. See Robert D. Cooter, Organizationas Property:Economic Analysis ofProperty Law
Applied to Privatization,J. LEGAL ECON., Dec. 1992, at 77, 93-94. See infra notes 177-80 and
accompanying text for further discussion regarding whether these are competing alternatives
and at what point a developing country might need to choose between them.
164. See MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND INSTITUTIONAL
DIVERSITY: COMPETITIVENESS IN JAPAN, THE USA, AND THE TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 117-19
(Stacey Jehlik trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
165. Or third, if you count the U.S. and the Japanese models of private enterprise as two
different paths.
166. See Simon, supra note 81, at 268; see also supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 82, at 350.
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think that managers should consider other stakeholders as well. 168
Other stakeholders of concern include employees, bondholders,
consumers, suppliers, the local community, and even the environment.169 Might TVEs better include some of these stakeholders and
better promote stable, long-term relationships among these various
interests?"7 °
In favor of such a possibility is the fact that TVEs are less
structured to respond to the interests of shareholders than U.S.
corporations. Insofar as TVEs respond to shareholders, if the
leading shareholder is the local government, then there is at least
a chance that local governments will represent broader interests
than private shareholders. Certainly one would hope that the local
government would represent the interests of the local community,
and because most of the employees and many of the suppliers and
consumers of a local ITVE will also be local residents, those interests
could be represented as well. There is also some rhetoric and even
law 171 favoring the involvement of employees in TVEs and SOEs.
The local government also may have less pressure or ability to sell
its interest than private shareholders of U.S. corporations, helping
to commit to a longer-run interest.
On the other hand, just because local government officials are
nominally supposed to represent the interests of local residents
does not mean that they actually do. Although there is some formal
and informal pressure on them to do so, much of their political
career still depends on pleasing higher-level officials. 172 Moreover,
both directly and indirectly through family and friends, officials
frequently have developed private pecuniary interests in enter-

168. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS ch. 9, (2002), for
an overview of this debate. Note that even if one believes that other stakeholder interests
should be considered, that does not necessarily imply that stakeholder constituency statutes
are a good idea. See Brett H. McDonnell, CorporationConstituency Statutes and Employee
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
169. See David Milon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundationsand Law
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1-2 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
170. Recall Article 14 of the Company Law, which requires companies to "strengthen the
construction of socialist culture and ideology." Company Law, supra note 126.
171. See Company Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 16 (1993) (mandating
certain trade unions).
172. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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prises which may conflict with the local public good.'7 3 One index of
the failure of TVEs to respond adequately to community interests
is their appalling environmental record.'7 4 Also, despite the official
encouragement of employee involvement in TVEs, actual active
involvement is infrequent.'
TVEs might come closer to their potential with reforms that
make them more responsive to the interests and concerns of local
residents. The obvious reform is to make local government officials
elected locally in free, open elections. Local officials' behavior may
change if their political survival turns on pleasing local residents
rather than higher officials. Local residents also may have better
information than higher officials as to the performance of local
officials. There already has been some movement in this direction,
with many local village officials now being elected, but elections are
not yet held at the township level.' 7 6 I am not aware of any research
which examines whether the behavior of TVEs has changed as a
result of local elections-that will be an interesting topic to watch
in the future. Of course, as I shall soon discuss further, this reform,
like many others, is limited by the Communist Party's monopoly
over political power. Local elections cannot involve contests between
different parties. They could, however, involve contests between
different individuals, if they can avoid the problem of Party
endorsement determining who wins, and that could be enough to do
much good.
Let us now compare and contrast these different available paths.
A first question is whether they really represent distinct alterna173. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 52-53 (explaining local officials' reputational interests as
an example of their conflict with local public good).
174. See Williams, supra note 60, at 247. One could, however, argue that the dismal
environmental surroundings fairly accurately represent the actual preferences of poor
peasants at an early stage of development because a clean environment may be a luxury
good.
175. See Stephen C. Smith, Employee Participationin China'sTVEs, 6 CmINAECON. REV.
157, 166 (1995), available at http://www.scsr.nevada.edu/-cer/ (discussing, through an
empirical study in the Zhejiang Province, that firm management, not employees, retain
significant decision-making ability) (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
176. See Matt Forney, Rural China Gets Tiny Taste ofDemocracy, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan.
14, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJA 5425953; Hugo Restall, Examining Asia: Electing
China's Leaders, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJA 23750680;
James A. Robinson, China'sElections OfferForm Without Substance, ASIAN WALLST. J., Jan.
25, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJA 2933598.
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tives. To some extent at least, I have overemphasized the distinctions. Many of the reforms discussed above under the rubric of
liberalization and privatization also would be useful for reforms
that try to extend and improve TVEs, and democratization of
political power would also be useful for reforms which focus on
creating a privatized market economy. As noted above, some think
that the distinction between U.S.-style and Japanese- or Germanstyle capitalist systems is overdone, and that banks and capital
markets really complement each other.'77
Though overdone, the distinctions are real alternatives among
which, at some point, China will have to choose. Alternatively, at
some point the cumulative effect of reforms may point enough in
one direction that it will become increasingly hard to switch
paths, 78 even if no conscious choice has been made. At that point,
the active market for corporate control, which is characteristic of
the U.S. system, would be very difficult to maintain while also
maintaining the close bank-firm relationship, which is characteristic of the Japanese system. 179 Maintaining a financial system
which fully backs both TVEs and private enterprises will also be
difficult-building a financial system which adequately supports
either one will be hard enough. There are also political obstacles in
maintaining dual systems--once one alternative becomes strong
enough, the entrenched interests it creates will have little incentive
to support opposing alternatives. There also may be complementarities between the different elements of corporate governance
which make it hard to keep two different systems going simultaneously. 0Ultimately China will have to choose, deliberately or not,
among the alternatives.
The next issue is the relative likelihood of the different paths.
The stagnation of TVEs in the 1990s suggests that one of the
privatization alternatives may be more likely. Moreover, increased
democratization may represent a greater threat to the interests
of the Party elite than liberalization and privatization, making
democratization less likely. The privatization alternatives are also
177.
178.
179.
180.

See supra note 162.
On the concept of "lock-in," see McDonnell, supranote 82, at 356.
See Cooter, supra note 163, at 94.
See id.
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advantageous because models of the end goal are readily available
in advanced capitalist economies, making it easier to learn how to
do things, whereas the TVE-focused alternative would involve
charting untested waters. Consequently, reforms focused on making
TVEs permanent seem less likely. On the other hand, the past
success of TVEs has created some powerful interests likely to favor
them, and TVEs provide a better ideological link to the Party's
socialist past, in case that matters to anyone anymore. The longterm decline of TVEs, therefore, is not certain yet, though it is more
probable than not.
Whether China's development is more likely to follow the U.S. or
Japanese and German models of capitalism is hard to determine at
this point. The problems faced by Japan, and to a lesser degree
Germany, in recent years have made the United States the
dominant model in international circles, 8 1 though more recent
problems in America have muted that effect somewhat. On the
other hand, the Japanese system seems to have more cultural
affinity with China than the U.S. system. In addition, the effect of
foreign direct investment also may play a role because foreign
businesses may tend to bring in the model of corporate governance
with which they are familiar. It is not yet clear what country will
have the greatest effect via this channel. Finally, it is not clear
which of the two forms of capitalism has stronger entrenched
interests supporting it politically. I would say that at this point
China could still readily follow either of these two paths.
A separate question is which of the paths-the U.S.-based or
Japanese- or German-based system-is more desirable. "Desirable,"
in turn, is ambiguous-one could desire efficiency, a fair distribution of wealth, or other goals, which may or may not favor the same
path. The choice between the two variants of capitalism has been
widely discussed. In an earlier paper, I argued that the two systems
are roughly equal in productive efficiency, but the U.S. system is
more flexible and adaptive, whereas the Japanese system is more
egalitarian. 182 It is, therefore, hard to compare the two, and which

181. See McDonnell, supra note 82, at 364-65, 381.
182. See id. at 381.

992

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:953

is better may well depend on how you weigh the relative values
83
involved in evaluating the two. 1
As for the TVE-dominated alternative, that comparison is made
more difficult by the fact that we do not yet have a well-developed
alternative to compare with the United States, Japan, and Germany. China today, while it has its attractions, is clearly not as
attractive as the more advanced economies. For reasons discussed
above, 8 4 however, democratic reforms might make the Chinese
alternative significantly more attractive than it is today. Could
democratic reforms go far enough to make the Chinese alternative
competitive with the leading capitalist countries? Some think it is
possible.' 5 I am rather skeptical. Experimentation and exploration
of the alternative would be interesting,'86 but I am not sure that the
expected returns from such an experiment are worth it for the
people of China who have come to expect continuing large improvements in economic development.
C. The Path of Aborted Reform
All of the discussion up to here has assumed that Chinese
reforms will continue and that the choice is between different paths
that all lead to relatively attractive end-states, though one can
debate which end is better. Leaving the discussion there though,
would be too optimistic. There is a real risk that the reform process
could bog down and that China could remain seriously underdevel18 7
oped.
There are at least two possible, interrelated sources of this risk.
The first is the "partial reform trap." 88 The creation of transitional
institutions, possibly including TVEs, may create vested interests
183. See id. at 362.
184. See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
185. See Simon, supra note 81, at 305-06.
186. On the value of such experimentation and preserving alternative systematic
approaches to corporate governance, see McDonnell, supra note 82, at 382-83.
187. See Thomas G. Rawski, China Reform Watch: Turning Point Looming, 38 CHINA
PERSP. 28 (2001).
188. See QIAN, supra note 78, at 38; see also Joel S. Helman, Winners Take All: The
PoliticsofPartialReform in Postcommunist Transitions,50 WORLD POL. 203,204-05,232-33
(1998).
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that seek to block further reform. There is some evidence of this
problem occurring in Russia and Eastern Europe."8 9 On the other
hand, it is also possible that interim reforms can create constituencies that back further reform. To at least some extent this has
already occurred in China. 9 ° The expansion of TVEs itself is an
example of this. The question, though, is whether the process is
likely to continue in China. Perhaps it will. After all, many local
officials have found it in their interest to privatize TVEs. Even after
this occurs, however, the problem of crony capitalism remains, and
one must look hard to see what political constituency exists to get
around that problem. One possible pressure for continued change
is China's joining the World Trade Organization. This creates
ongoing international pressure for China to open up its economy to
competition and make its internal markets a more level playing
field. The pressure to keep up with international competitors could
then make many agents in China more focused on improving
efficiency. 9'

The other, related obstacle to continued reform is the Communist
Party's continuing monopoly on power. The Party has a long, baleful
history of interference in all areas of life in China. That Party's
power was catastrophic for economic development, not to mention
individual liberty. A big part of the genius of reforms to date is that
they help partially commit the Party to less daily interference
with the decision making of enterprises. Indeed, the reforms
have managed to give local Party and government officials strong
incentives to help local enterprises succeed.
Although success so far does not guarantee continued success, the
reforms at this juncture seem to have created significant pressure
for continued reform. The career success of officials is to a great
extent tied to the economic success of the region or industry for
which they are responsible. The political legitimacy of the Party and
government today seem almost completely tied to delivering the
goods-the old communist ideology seems increasingly irrelevant.
Many local officials now also have private pecuniary stakes in
189. See QLAN, supra note 78, at 38.
190. See id.

191. See QIAN & WU, supra note 78, at 3, 17-18.
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continued economic development. Entrepreneurs are growing in
92
number and political influence. 1
Yet, obstacles remain. If you look at just about every reform
suggested earlier in this Part, questions abound as to the interests
of Party and government officials. 9 3 Are they willing to reduce the
power of state banks and the ability of SOEs to tap the stock
markets? Are they willing to allow courts to become truly independent, thus risking decisions which could seriously hurt them and
limit their power? Are they willing to expose themselves to free
elections and ultimately to opposition parties? The answers to these
questions are still quite unclear. The Party itself has conflicting
interests, and individual officials now have quite complicated
relationships with the Party. The hope is that individuals, and even
the Party itself, are now committed enough to the path of reform
that they will be unable to turn back, even if future reforms scare
them. The fear is that at some point reforms may become too
threatening to the Party's hold on power, and those at the top of the
hierarchy may apply the brakes. After all, it has already happened
once during the reform process, although the braking then turned
94
out to be temporary. 1
Thus, we have to add a third or fourth 95 possible path: reform
may be blocked, leaving the system in its current mix of market
and state. Aborted reform, in turn, might be thought of as having
two possible sub-paths. In one of these, the economy stagnates,
unrest grows, and the Party must resort to force, more or less
successfully, to keep itself in power. In the other sub-path, even
with blocked reform, the economy manages to grow enough to
dampen serious dissent. The Party maintains largely unchallenged
political control. Some recent analysts see China headed towards
fascism (of the Italian style), with the Party retaining firm political
control while supporting and supported by private business

192. See Michelle A. Wong, Comment, China'sDirect Marketing Ban: A Case Study of
China's Response to Capital-Based Social Networks, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 257, 273
(2002).
193. See Rawski, supra note 187.
194. Following the massacre at Tiananmen Square, opponents of reform slowed the
process for several years, but it soon resumed. See Wong, supra note 192, at 261.
195. See supra note 165.
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interests (a form of crony capitalism). 196 This scenario is basically
the more successful sub-path of blocked reform.
Although it seems clear that the path of aborted reform is less
desirable than any of the others, what about its likelihood? There
is reason for guarded hope that this path is unlikely. Reforms seem
to have created strong pressure for further reform. Slowdowns and
temporary blockages are likely, but it would probably now be hard
to shut down the reform process completely. A complete shutdown
is far from impossible, however, and it may well be more likely than
the TVE-focused path of democratization described above. Blocked
reform, however, is probably less likely than either of the paths that
lead to a modern capitalist system along American or Japanese
lines.
VI. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-FOUR
LESSONS

The ultimate point of this Article is to examine developments
in China, particularly TVEs, and see what those developments
can teach us about the relationship between property rights and
economic development. The story we have considered in the previous Parts of this Article suggests that a simplistic version of
this relationship will not do at all. In a very simple version of the
standard economist's story, the key to achieving economic development is to define property rights clearly. Development will take off
with properly developed property rights. 9 ' This story places too
much emphasis on clearly defining property rights. Property rights
matter, but so do a number of other things. Focusing on rights first
is not always the best approach for a developing country. I elaborate
on this basic point in four lessons.

196. See Becker, supra note 161, at 16.
197. For how the standard property rights story applies to the theory of the firm, see
sources cited supra notes 21-22. The great modem source of the property rights approach in
law and economics is Coase's classic paper on social cost. See supra note 22. A leading
contemporary policy entrepreneur pushing the property rights approach is Hernando de Soto.
See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER

PATH (June Abbott trans., Ist Perennial Library ed. 1990).
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A. Lesson One: Property Rights Are Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Development
Puzzle one, the success of TVEs in the 1980s, shows that clearly
defined property rights to residual income and control are not
necessary for successful enterprises. At the beginning, property
rights in TVEs were quite fuzzy, and yet TVEs succeeded in
becoming a dynamic, central part of China's rapid development.
Puzzle two, the slowdown of TVEs in the 1990s, suggests that
clearly defined property rights are not sufficient for successful
enterprises. As shown in Part III, in the late '80s and early '90s,
extensive property rights reforms occurred in many TVEs. Although
the reforms seem to have increased efficiency, the relative growth
of TVEs ended afterwards. In part this is because rights reform
made private enterprises more attractive than previously. However,
it is also in part because other obstacles to TVEs remained, in
particular the extreme limitations of Chinese financial institutions.
Moreover, legal property rights reforms are not enough for Chinese
enterprises to achieve good corporate governance-we have seen in
the United States that good corporate governance requires a host
98
of supporting institutions. 1
Thus, property rights matter, but other institutions matter too,
including banks, capital markets, labor markets, product markets,
political structure, and norms. These interact in complicated ways
to foster, or hinder, good corporate governance and economic
development. This interaction also suggests another complicating
factor. If it is the interaction of many institutions that matters,
then for each institution, including the legal definition of property
rights, the best current version of that institution may depend, in
part, upon the current state of a variety of other institutions. 9 9
Full-fledged privatization, for instance, may well not have made

198. See supra notes 108-10, 142 and accompanying text.
199. A variety of economists have analyzed the possibility of such institutional
complementarity. See AOKI, supra note 23, at 87-88, 207-08, 225-29; Susan Gates et al.,
Complementaritiesin the Transition from Socialism: A Firm-Level Analysis, in REFORMING
ASIAN SOCIALISM, supra note 3, at 17-22; Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, The Economics of
Modern Manufacturing:Technology, Strategy, and Organization,80 AM. ECON. REV. 511,525
(1990); Paredes, supra note 129, at 1106-09.
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sense for Chinese enterprises in the early '80s, when the institutions needed to support private enterprises were not in place.
This suggests a typology of theories along two lines of variation.
Theories of development may place greater or lesser emphasis upon
property rights as opposed to other institutions. They also may be
more universalistic or more particularistic. The possibility of a more
particularistic approach arises from the point about the interrelation between institutions. The more important one believes this
point is, the less one is likely to prescribe a one-size-fits-all policy
for any one type of institution regardless of the current state of
other institutions in any particular society at a moment in time.
Figure 4 illustrates the possibilities. The x-axis handles property
rights versus other institutions. The further to the right one
moves on the axis, the greater the relative importance of property
rights as opposed to other institutions. The y-axis handles the
universality dimension. The higher up one moves on this axis, the
more universalistic the theory. Thus, a simplistic version of the
pure economic property rights story might be represented by point
A-strong emphasis on property rights and highly universalistic.
An extreme institutionalist theory might be represented by point
C-much emphasis on institutions other than property rights
and highly particularistic. 00 The positions on the two axes tend
to be positively correlated, but there are exceptions. For instance,
Hernando de Soto, represented by point D, places prime importance
on property rights, but thinks that how to best protect property
rights depends heavily on a country's particular circumstances
and customs.2 ' My own preferred approach would be something
like point B-closer to the institutionalist theory, but recognizing
that property rights are fairly important, and not too extremely
particularistic.
One last point to make within the confines of this first lesson
concerns the particular other institutions that are of special
interest in the Chinese case. Product market competition and
federalism are of great importance to the developments in China.
Opened-up product markets created room for TVEs to grow, and
200. Aoki's theory does not place a lot of emphasis on property rights. See AoIo, supra note
23, at 35-55. His particularism, while notable, is not extreme.
201. See DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 197, at 185-87.
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product market competition creates strong pressure for good, or at
least not disastrously bad, corporate governance. The federalism of
the Chinese government and the Communist Party created incentives on the part of local officials to develop TVEs and competition
among officials, which helped spur better performance. 2
The importance of these institutions should not be a surprise to
Americans, as they may well have been key to our own economic
development. Consider the pivotal moment of 1787 and the creation
of the U.S. Constitution. The creation of a common market was one
of the leading goals and effects of the union, and surely it had a
powerful influence on the growth that followed. Federalism was, of
course, a central feature of that constitution. Although a Bill of
Rights was soon appended, the early federalists argued that citizens
would be protected from government intrusion less by enumerated
rights than by the structural protections created by federalism and
the separation of powers. 20 3 Have Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang,
in some small, halting way, followed in the path of James Madison?
B. Lesson Two: PoliticalConstraintsMatter
One major obstacle that property rights reforms face is that
they may well hurt groups with enough political power to block
the reforms. In the case of China, the most obvious and critical
such group consists of the Party and the State officials, who will
find their ability to intervene in economic affairs limited and who
ultimately may risk losing political control altogether. Other groups
are at risk too. For instance, the managers and employees of SOEs
could find that their jobs are in jeopardy as other enterprises
threaten theirs and as cost cutting becomes necessary in response.
If a reform is too threatening to groups that are too powerful, that
reform will not occur, no matter how much it might advance the
public interest.
Thus, if those who propose property rights reforms actually care
about seeing them implemented, they need to think carefully about
political constraints on the passage and implementation of reforms.
202. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 32-42.
203. See THE FEDERALIST No. 20 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison).
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Political constraints matter. A very interesting element of reform
in China is how it has managed to handle those constraints so far.
China has reformed gradually, creating transitional institutions,
rather than trying to leap immediately to institutions that closely
resemble those in the West.2 °4 One effect of this approach is that old
institutions are not immediately destroyed, and those who rely on
those institutions are not too badly harmed. 20 5 For instance, SOEs
have not been eliminated or shed workers too quickly. Instead, they
have just not expanded much, allowing other enterprises, including
TVEs, to surpass them. The existing SOE employees keep their
jobs, but new entrants to the job market go to more dynamic
enterprises. Thus, a potential strong voice against reform is, if not
completely silenced, then at least seriously muted.
The gradualist nature of reform in China, however, has done
more than simply neutralize potential opponents. It also has helped
create powerful political supporters of further reform. We have
seen how early reforms encouraged local officials to greatly expand
TVEs.2 °6 We also have seen how experimentation with TVEs and
changing circumstances led local officials to further contractual and
property rights reforms as a way of improving the performance of
those TVEs that had become so important to their careers. °7 The
personal and general gains to be had from privatizing TVEs and
allowing private enterprises and foreign investment then pushed
local officials into yet more reforms. 2 Hopefully, this process has
not yet stopped. Thus, the process of gradual, step-by-step reform
in China, so far, has managed both to mute potential opponents and
to create political support for further reform in a self-sustaining
dynamic process. 201

204. See QIAN, supra note 78, at 11-12.
205. See id. at 25, 43 (stating that economic reform in China has suited existing interests);
see also Lawrence J. Lau et al., Reform Without Losers: An Interpretationof China'sDualTrack Approach to Transition, 108 J. POL. ECON. 120, 135-36, 140-42 (2000) (noting
.continued enforcement of the rights and obligations under the plan" in the midst of economic
liberalization).
206. See supra Part I.
207. See supra Part III.
208. See supra Part III.
209. There is no guarantee, however, that this process will continue. See supra Part V.
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Other countries pursuing economic development will need to
follow different specific paths, tied to the specific economic and
political environment they face. Reformers anywhere, however,
must take care that their ideas are politically achievable and
sustainable. China provides an interesting case study in how that
can be achieved. China's gradualist, step-by-step approach may
have its problems, though, as we shall discuss when we come to
lesson four.
C. Lesson Three: PropertyRights Are both the Effect and Cause of
Development
The traditional economists' story about property rights and
development features clear, well-protected property rights as the
leading cause of economic development. Yet, the historical sequence
of TVEs in China does not fit this story. At the beginning of reforms
TVEs had ill-defined property rights, while private enterprises had
little protection at all. Other reforms, such as opened-up product
market competition, strengthened federalism, and agrarian reform
provided the initial impetus for new sorts of enterprises. It was only
after TVEs started to become successful that their success started
to create political momentum for property rights reform.2 1 ° In
China, at least, property rights were at least as much the effect of
economic development as its cause.
Of course, the causation is not unidirectional. Once property
rights reform started to occur, it, in turn, spurred further development.2 1 1 Thus, property rights reform in China was both the effect
and the cause of economic development. The two forces have
managed to develop into a self-reinforcing virtuous circle. This third
lesson is supported by the second lesson: property rights reform
probably became politically feasible only once China reached a
certain stage in economic and institutional development.
Moreover, protection of property rights itself should not be
thought of as simply a political and legal matter. Much development

210. See supra Part III.
211. See supra Part III. Chen provides strong analysis of this process of "induced
privatization." See CHEN, supra note 7, at 212-19.
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and protection of property rights occurs within the market itself 212
For instance, the protection of minority shareholders is not simply
a matter of having good laws on the books, or even of having
independent courts which enforce those laws, although that would
certainly help in China. Much protection of minority shareholders
comes through market mechanisms and norms.213 Protection of
shareholders thus develops gradually along with the development of markets, rather than preceding it. 214 Frequently formal
legal protections of shareholders will come along rather late in
the process, as happened in the United States and the United
Kingdom.2 18 When some legal reform does come before other
mechanisms are well in place, as was the case for Chinese SOEs
and the new Company Law of 1993, the law will remain something
of a dead letter until other supporting institutions have developed
adequately.
All of this is not to deny that property rights matter or to treat
them as an epiphenomenon. At some point well-developed legal
protection of various stakeholders within enterprises probably
becomes crucial to continued development. That may be particularly true as the optimal size of enterprises increases, and
informal mechanisms become inadequate to the task of protecting
investors.2 16 China may well have reached that point, or at least
be nearing it. The question of the optimal sequencing of various
economic reforms is very hard, and will vary quite a bit from
country to country. In some cases emphasizing the legal protection
of property rights optimally will occur sooner than in others. The
legal protection of property rights need not, and often will not, come
right at the beginning of a process of development.
Another qualification to this lesson, one which applies to this
entire Article, is that I am focusing on a particular kind of relatively
212. See generally Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of the State and the Market in
EstablishingProperty Rights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 (1996) (arguing that property rights
develop largely as "a product of market forces, rather than government fiat").
213. See id. at 99-101; Paredes, supra note 129, at 1085, 1091-92.
214. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise ofDispersed Ownership: The Roles ofLaw and the State
in the Separationof Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (2001).
215. See id.
216. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 51-52 (noting that property rights in TVEs are protected
because the small number of owners have oversight of the TVE management).
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sophisticated property right, namely the rights of participants in
business organizations. This is a more complicated type of right
than the right of an individual over personal or real property. It
very well may be true that protecting those simpler and more basic
kinds of property rights does and should occur earlier in economic
development than the protection of business association rights.
Thus, a part of the difference between my account here and the
analysis of people such as de Soto"l y may simply be that we are
concentrating on different sorts of rights.
D. Lesson Four: The Path of Reform May Affect What Is Reachable in the End
The development path followed may determine which end-states
China can reach feasibly. This is the most speculative of the four
lessons-one cannot conclude with certainty anything about this
topic from China, because China today is still so far from any of its
possible end-states. This lesson, however, is an important possibility for reformers to consider, as it creates a tough trade-off between
short- and long-term goals of reform.
At some point, certain reforms could make it extremely hard, if
not impossible, to reach one of the possible future paths described
in Part V. Economists in recent years have recognized a variety of
mechanisms by which economic development may be path-dependent. That is, past developments will open up some possible future
developments while foreclosing others.21 8 One reason this may
occur is that past developments may create political groups which
block future changes which threaten them.2 19 Another reason is
that various institutions within an economy may complement
one another. Once a certain set of complementary institutions has

217. See supra note 197.
218. See Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and
Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 27-28
(Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dare eds., 1994); W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms
in Economics, in THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 9, 13-14 (Philip W.
Anderson et al. eds., 1988); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 332, 332 (1985); McDonnell, supra note 82, at 356.
219. See supra Part VI.B.
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become dominant, it will be very hard to change any one of those
institutions in a way inconsistent with the rest.22 °
For instance, if reforms in China were to create a very strong
vested interest in SOEs and TVEs, that interest might be able to
block new reforms which would help support private enterprises.
Conversely, if private enterprises become well-entrenched economically and politically then there may not be political support for
other reforms which might help TVEs develop into a truly unique,
long-lasting business organization alternative. Similar possibilities exist for the two Western-style sub-paths.2 2 1 If China were to
develop a Japanese-style banking system, that might limit its
ability to expand stock markets along a U.S.-style model. Conversely, if it develops U.S.-style capital markets it may not be able
to simultaneously develop a Japanese-style banking system.2 2 2
If this fourth lesson is true, then the strategy of reform becomes
much more complicated. Lessons two and three have stressed the
gradualist, step-by-step nature of Chinese reform. Rather than
identifying a clear long-run end-state and aiming directly for that,
Chinese reformers have focused on what can be done in the near
term to help move the economy forward. This process even has a
name: "grasping for stones to cross the river."2 23 Lesson two showed
how this process has helped China advance within its political
constraints. Lesson three showed how saving property rights reform for later in the process has helped generate a self-propelling
dynamic.
Lesson four, however, draws our attention to a problem of this
process which focuses on what looks best in the relatively short
term. The short-term reforms may change what one can achieve in
the long run. A reform which looks attractive in the short run may
wind up foreclosing the most attractive long-run path. The natural
response would seem to be to ask that reformers consider these
long-run effects as well. There are at least two problems with the
response, however. First, the incentives of those in power may be
unduly focused on short-run success rather than long-run success,
220.
221.
222.
223.

See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-80 for some reasons for possible incompatibilities.
CHEN, supra note 7, at 210.
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as their personal stake may not extend as long as the national
interest. This may well be a greater problem for democracies than
for authoritarian governments such as China, but the problem still
remains. Second, it may be very hard to predict the long-term
effects of current reforms.
It is not a necessary truth that there must be a conflict between
what reforms are best in the short and the long run; the two may
coincide. I do not see any good reason to believe that China has yet
forestalled any of the possible future paths described in Part V. The
day may yet come, however, when China faces decisions which will
block one or more of those paths, even if it is hard to tell when that
day has arrived. But, hey, no one ever said economic development
was easy.
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TABLE 1
Percentage of Total Industrial Output by Type of Enterprise
Year
State-owned
Collective
Private
Other
1952
41.54
3.26
20.57
34.63
1957
53.77
19.03
0.83
26.37
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

89.33
89.54
90.07
90.18
88.46

10.67
10.46
9.93
9.82
11.54

1968

88.42

11.58

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

88.71
87.61
85.91
84.88
84.02
82.41

11.29
12.39
14.09
15.12
15.98
17.59

1975

81.09

18.91

1976
1977
1978
1979

78.33
77.03
77.63
78.47

21.67
22.97
22.37
21.53

....
....
....
....

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

75.97
74.76
74.44
73.36
69.09
64.86
62.27
59.73
56.80
54.06
54.60
56.16
51.52
46.95
37.34
33.97
36.32
31.62
28.24
28.21

23.54
24.62
24.82
25.74
29.71
32.03
33.51
34.62
36.15
35.69
35.62
33.00
35.07
34.02
37.72
36.59
39.39
38.11
38.41
35.37

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.12
0.19
1.85
2.76
3.64
4.34
4.80
5.39
4.83
5.80
7.98
10.09
12.86
15.48
17.92
17.11
18.18

....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
..
....

Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2001, p. 20.

0.47
0.58
0.68
0.78
1.01
1.21
1.46
2.02
2.72
3.44
4.38
6.01
7.61
11.05
14.85
16.58
16.65
18.45
22.91
26.14
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Figure 3
Flow of Benefits and Control Rights
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Source: Derived from CHEN, supra note 7, at 22.
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Property Rights and Institutions

A
Property Rights
Theory
Universality

D
De Sot

C

Institutionalist
( Theory
Importance of Property Rights

